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Reassessing Pre-Market Regulation of Class III Medical Devices
Abstract
1Regulation of medical devices has evolved over the past twenty-ﬁve years. Initially,
Congress created a regime where the safety and eﬃcacy of all medical devices would be
reviewed to varying degrees, depending on the risk posed by the device. Class III devices,
the most dangerous class of devices, were to each have a safety and eﬃcacy review. To
permit new market entrants on similar grounds as those marketing devices prior to the
1976 Amendments, Congress also created a premarket notiﬁcation program, under which
new devices were regulated in the same way as the pre-Amendment counterparts. However,
the premarket notiﬁcation program has evolved and taken over market authorization for
all devices, including Class III devices. This paper argues that the premarket notiﬁcation
program has changed so much that it should be entirely eliminated for Class III medical
devices.
Introduction
Over the past ﬁfty years, technology has advanced by leaps and bounds. Thus, medical devices have likewise
made substantial technological advances, and resulted in just as substantial advances in patient care. Al-
though progress in medical device technology has been steady, the law regulating medical devices has been
stagnant for long periods. Furthermore, to address new problems, the law regulating medical devices has
built upon the existing statutory framework. Thus, the law is composed of temporary ﬁxes, with one patch
aimed at ﬁxing a particular problem serving as the foundation for the solution for a wholly diﬀerent problem.
One area in which this patchwork pattern is particularly evident is in the premarket notiﬁcation process,
or 510(k). The program, which was initially adopted to ease the transition from an era of virtually no
medical device regulation to one requiring premarket regulation, has morphed into a separate mechanism
for marketing approval. However, this mechanism focuses review on an irrelevant question (namely is a new
device “substantially similar” to a pre-Amendment device) and creates both motive and opportunity for
2manufacturers to largely skirt any type of relevant substantive review.
This paper will argue that the medical devices that pose the most risk, the “Class III devices,” ought to be
reviewed only for safety and eﬃcacy. While a determination of “substantial equivalence” may be appropri-
ate for devices which are generally considered safe, this type of review, especially given the way the FDA
interprets “substantially equivalent,” is wholly unsuited for devices which are by deﬁnition inherently less
safe. The American public does and must continue to rely on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
protect it from potentially harmful medical products. Thus the FDA should take its charge seriously, and
look at Class III devices only for safety and eﬃcacy, not “substantial equivalence.”
History
When Congress passed the 1938 Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) only had authority to regulate medical devices if they were misbranded (i.e., contained false or
misleading claims) or adulterated (i.e., unsanitary or unsafe).1 Thus, the FDA had no authority to review
products prior to marketing. Instead, the FDA served as the Consumers Union of the medical device ﬁeld
by ridding the marketplace after the fact of devices which were misbranded or adulterated.
In 1976, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and authorized the FDA for the ﬁrst time
to regulate medical devices for more than adulteration and misbranding.2 In 1962, in response to the
Thalidomide disaster, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962 permitting premarket review of drugs.3
At that time, there was also a proposal to permit premarket review of medical devices. However, in order
to get the drug amendments passed quickly, Congress removed the sections regulating medical devices from
the bill. Therefore, between 1962 and 1976, a few devices that the FDA wanted to regulate were facetiously
classiﬁed as drugs by the FDA (with judicial support) in order to give the FDA power to regulate them.4
1Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1753, 1802 (1996).
2Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
3Merrill, supra note 1, at 1764.
4See United States v. An Article of Drug ...Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Peter Barton Hutt and
3When the 1976 Amendments provided the FDA with statutory authority to actively regulate medical devices
prior to marketing, the FDA no longer had to regulate any medical devices as drugs.
By statute, Congress acknowledged that a very broad range of items could, and should, be regulated by the
FDA in order to ensure public safety. The deﬁnition of “medical device” reﬂects this intent. The FDCA
deﬁnes a medical device as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is...(2)
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended to aﬀect the
structure or any function of the body of a man or other animal, and which does not achieve
its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or
other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of
its primary intended purposes.5
Therefore, Congress deﬁned “medical device” as everything but a drug that is remotely related to medicine.
Some devices should clearly be reviewed prior to marketing, such as implantable items like pacemakers and
intraocular lenses. After all, it was problems with items like these which spurred a signiﬁcant amount of
pressure toward FDA regulation of medical devices.6 Implantable items like these should be regulated in
order to insure long-term safety to the extent possible and minimize the need for subsequent corrective
surgeries and the resulting potential for permanent harm. However, more mundane items such as catheters,
needles, and surgical scissors are also regulated to some extent in order to insure patient safety.
One drawback of Congress’s broad deﬁnition of “medical device” was that the FDA immediately had an
extremely large number of products to regulate. Because of the enormous number of medical devices in
existence even in 1976, as well as the diﬀerence in complexity between diﬀerent devices, Congress and the
FDA realized that regulating medical devices appropriately (i.e., in a cost- and time-eﬀective manner) would
not be conducive to a one-size-ﬁts-all solution. Instead, Congress created a scheme in which devices were
Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, 732-3 (2d ed. 1991).
6H. Rept. No. 853, 94th Congress, 2d Session (1976) reprinted in Hutt & Merrill, supra note 4, at 743.
4divided up into three classes based on the level of regulatory oversight required to ensure patient safety and
product eﬃcacy. Thus, from the very beginning, the scheme included “tailor[ing] the degree of regulatory
control to the nature of the device.”7 Class I devices were those which were assumed safe, providing that the
proper manufacturing controls were in place. Class II devices were presumed safe if the proper manufacturing
controls were in place and the devices met a device-speciﬁc performance standard which the FDA was to
create. Finally, Class III devices were the devices which were life sustaining (or presented a potential
unreasonable risk), implantable, or all post-1976 devices.8 The devices in Class III were to all go through a
review of safety and eﬃcacy (called the premarket approval process, or PMA) at some time. Class III devices
that were new had to be reviewed prior to marketing. However, in order to allow continued use of Class III
devices already on the market, the statute permitted continued marketing of Class III devices already on
the market, but required that the FDA call for a PMA to review safety and eﬃcacy at some future point for
those devices.9
In order to rectify any inequities between device manufacturers who marketed their products prior to the
1976 Amendments and those marketing their products after the Amendments, Congress permitted products
which were new to the market but similar to pre-Amendment products to be marketed until the FDA called
for a safety and eﬃcacy review for all the devices of that type. The manufacturer could simply notify the
FDA that the new product was substantially equivalent to a pre-Amendment “predicate” device 90 days
before initiating marketing. As long as the FDA did not notify the manufacturer that the new device and
proposed predicate were not substantially equivalent (NSE), the manufacturer was free to market the new
device. This process was called premarket notiﬁcation (PMN) or 510(k). Thus, using this submission, if
a device manufacturer could show that its device was “substantially equivalent” to a device on the market
7Peter Barton Hutt et al., The Standard of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976, 47 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 605, 614 (1992).
821 U.S.C. §360c(a)(1).
9Hutt & Merrill, supra note 4, at 753.
5prior to the 1976 Amendments, the new device would be regulated the same way that the pre-Amendment
counterpart was regulated. Thus, the new device was temporarily exempt from a lengthy and costly review
of safety and eﬃcacy.
One foreseeable consequence of regulating devices post-1976 is that the FDA became overburdened. The
Agency was required to classify all medical devices on the market, call for PMA’s for all Class III devices,
create performance standards for all Class II devices, and review all the incoming PMA’s and 510(k)’s for new
devices that manufacturers wanted to begin marketing. Simply keeping up with the incoming applications
was a substantial burden, and the government and public demanded both speed and a high standard of
safety and eﬃcacy in the review process.
Premarket Approval
As stated above, a full review of a product’s safety and eﬃcacy is done through the premarket approval
(PMA) process. Unlike its drug counterpart, the PMA has only to provide “reasonable assurance” of safety
and eﬀectiveness.10 After all, “all medical products are associated with some level of risk, and a product is
considered safe if its risks are determined to be reasonable given the magnitude of the beneﬁt expected.”11
In determining safety and eﬃcacy, the FDA was to consider the end user, conditions of use prescribed in
the labeling, and the beneﬁt weighed against the risk posed.12 Thus for example, devices used solely by
physicians or other trained professionals are regulated diﬀerently than those to be used by a layperson.
The statute speciﬁcally noted that the standard for medical devices is more ﬂexible than that of drugs, by
stating that clinical trials may not be appropriate in all circumstances.13 Thus the FDA has great latitude
to determine the amount of data necessary for these submissions.
1021 U.S.C. §360e(d)(2), 360(c)(i), and Benjamin A. Goldberger, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in FDA’s Pre-
market Review of Medical Devices, 56 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 317, 318 (2001).
11United States General Accounting Office, Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval Times, Withdrawals, and
Other Agency Activities 6 (2002).
1221 U.S.C. §360c(a)(2).
13Compare 21 U.S.C. §355(d) (the standard for drugs) with 21 U.S.C. §360c(a)(3) (the standard for devices).
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In a 510(k) submission, the manufacturer does not have to show safety or eﬃcacy despite the fact that the
purpose of the 1976 Amendments was to “protect the public from unsafe and ineﬀective medical devices with
the minimum possible level of regulation.”14 Instead, a manufacturer merely provides comparative informa-
tion between the new device and the predicate.15 Thus, at the core of the process, the premarket notiﬁcation
process does not connote a product’s safety and eﬀectiveness.16 Instead, the premarket notiﬁcation process
merely opines that two devices are “substantial equivalents” and thus should be regulated in the same way.
Because “substantial equivalence” does not appear in any other place in the FDCA, the FDA had con-
siderable discretion in deﬁning what makes devices substantially equivalent. The drafters of the statute
intentionally chose language that diﬀered from the language describing drug review in order to demonstrate
that devices were to be reviewed under a diﬀerent, and more relaxed, standard. However, the constraints of
the more relaxed standard were not clear to industry and not necessarily uniform throughout the FDA. It
was not until 1986 that the FDA promulgated an advisory document notifying device manufacturers what
factors were being considered in order to determine whether a device was substantially equivalent to an-
other.17 This guidance document, having no statutory authority, was later codiﬁed in 1990.18
The FDA’s interpretation of “substantially equivalent” was based ﬁrst on the intended use of the product
and second on the technological characteristics. Under 21 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1), a device can only be found to
be substantially equivalent to another device if the two devices have the same “intended use.” Unfortunately,
the deﬁnition of “intended use” is also unclear, thus giving the FDA considerable latitude in determining
whether two devices have the same intended use. Because intended use is the threshold question (without
14Remarks by Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, at the Health Industry Manufacturers Association
Annual Meeting, as quoted by Hutt et al, supra note 7, at 606.
15Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Guidance on the CDRH Premarket Notification Review Program
(1986). Available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/k863.html.
16Robert B. Leﬂar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 28 (1989).
17Center for Devices and Radiological Health, supra note 15.
1821 U.S.C. §360c(i).
7it two devices simply cannot be substantially equivalent), the way in which the FDA exercises its discretion
is of monumental importance to device manufacturers.19 If the two devices have the same intended use and
also have the same technological characteristics, the two devices are substantially equivalent.20 However,
if the two devices have diﬀerent technological characteristics and the diﬀerences have no adverse eﬀect on
safety and eﬀectiveness (and the new device does not riase diﬀerent questions of safety and eﬃcacy), the
devices are considered substantial equivalents. Under the latter prong, the manufacturer generally has to
demonstrate that the new device’s unique technological characteristics have no adverse eﬀect on safety and
eﬃcacy through some type of scientiﬁc test. Initially, it was not clear whether the FDA had the implied au-
thority from Congress to request clinical and/or preclinical data from manufacturers in support of a 510(k).
However, the manufacturers were inclined not to protest because the alternative route to marketing was
going through the PMA process.21 Thus, the “mini-PMA” or “hybrid 510(k)” was born.22
The FDA is required by statute to use the “least burdensome means” to establish that their objective has
been met.23 In other words, for 510(k)’s, the FDA must use the least burdensome means to determine that
one device is substantially equivalent to another, and for a PMA, the FDA must use the least burdensome
means to establish a reasonable assurance of safety and eﬃcacy. “Least burdensome means” is another
statutory term which deﬁes a strict deﬁnition. The industry proﬀered one structure, where the FDA would
have to sequentially step through levels in order of increasing diﬃculty to the manufacturers, and stop at the
19Center for Devices and Radiological Health, supra note 15 lists examples of devices that are substantially equivalent,
as well as those that are not.
2021 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(B) states that changes in design, materials, and energy source are examples when technological
characteristics may diﬀer. Center for Devices and Radiological Health, supra note 15 states that to determine if a
technical diﬀerence exists, consider 1) whether the new device and the predicate device pose the same type of questions
regarding safety and eﬀectiveness, 2) whether scientiﬁc methods exist to evaluate if safety and eﬀectiveness have been adversely
aﬀected as a result of the new technical characteristics, and 3) whether the data shows that the new technical characteristics
have not adversely aﬀected safety and eﬀectiveness.
21Goldberger, supra note 10 at 324.
22Leﬂar, supra note 16 at 55.
2321 U.S.C. 360c(i)(1)(D).
8least burdensome possible step where the FDA received the data that it needed. The FDA posed the opposite
structure, where the question asked initially is whether a randomized trial is the least burdensome means to
provide reasonable assurance of safety/eﬀectiveness (in PMA) or substantial equivalence (for 510(k)).24 In
the end, Congress has determined that the burden is on the FDA to show that the information they request
is necessary and that there is no easier way to obtain that information.
The “substantial equivalence” review is entirely internal to the FDA. Although most Agency actions “that
have immediate and substantial impact” are challengable by statute,25 “the substantial equivalence review
process is a black box, entirely shielded from the public scrutiny that Congress deemed essential to the
premarket clearance process.”26 Although many manufacturers would not dare judicially challenge an FDA
decision because of future adverse ramiﬁcations,27 the fact that manufacturers have no opportunity to
challenge the FDA despite the signiﬁcant impact an NSE ﬁnding can have on a company is troubling.
Furthermore, the lack of information available regarding the devices and any testing done for the 510(k)
hinders physicians and anyone else looking into product performance from learning about the product.28
As a concession to manufacturers, the FDA agreed to seal much of the applications on grounds that the
information is proprietary. The summaries which are available to the public frequently simply state that
the product was tested and found to be at least as safe and eﬀective as the predicate.29 However, if the
Agency is unwilling to mark the product “safe and eﬀective for its intended use,” thus putting the onus
24John J. Smith and Anne M. Shyjan, Deﬁning “Least Burdensome Means” Under the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, 55 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 435, 445-446 (2000).
25Judicial review is sprinkled throughout the statute. For example, see 21 U.S.C. §360g.
26Leﬂar, supra note 16 at 34.
27See Allegations of FDA Abuses of Authority: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 104th Cong.
(1996).
28Leﬂar, supra note 16 at 33, 55.
29A searchable database of recent 510(k) summary sheets or letters is available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPMN/pmn.cfm.
9on the physicians, hospitals and insurance companies to determine a device’s safety prior to use, the FDA
should not shield the relevant information under a cloak of secrecy.
Congressional Approval of 510(k) Regulations
As noted above, when the 1976 Amendments were written, the 510(k) was envisioned to be a temporary ﬁx
that prevented unduly disadvantaging post-Amendment devices compared to their virtually identical pre-
Amendment counterparts. However, the FDA used their regulatory authority to change the 510(k) scheme
from one of simple notiﬁcation to a clearance requirement for market approval.30 Prior to 1990, both industry
and the FDA assumed that after the 90 day period had elapsed, if the manufacturer had not been given either
a “substantial equivalence” or “NSE” determination, the manufacturer was free under the statute to market
the device at its own risk. However, regulations created by the FDA required a “substantial equivalence”
determination prior to marketing. In 1990, the FDA’s regulations were codiﬁed.31 Thus, the FDA had to give
a determination of substantial equivalence before a manufacturer could market a device. The FDA therefore
created a second, substantially less onerous method for medical devices to be reviewed prior to marketing.32
As a result, the 510(k) has become the predominant method of approval. In ﬁscal years 1998 to 2001, the
FDA received between 4200 and 4625 original applications per year,33 where approximately 99% of these
applications were 510(k) applications. Given that approximately 99 percent of 510(k)’s receive “substantially
equivalent” determinations and only about 75-84 percent of PMA’s are approved,34 the disparity between
the number of approved PMA’s and approved 510(k)’s is even greater.
The reason that there are such large numbers of 510(k)’s is not because technology has been stagnant
30Rodney R. Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation of Medical Devices over the Last Fifty Years, 50 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 163, 168 (1995).
31Smith and Shyjan, supra note 24, at 437.
32Mohan memorandum stated when 510(k)’s were the appropriate mechanism for market clearance. See Munsey, supra note
30 at 168.
33An “original” application is one that is not a supplemental 510(k), a special 510(k), or a supplemental PMA.
34Office of Device Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Report Part 7 (2002).ODE Annual Report, 2002, available
at www.fda.gov/cdrh/annual/fy2002/ode/toc.html.
10since 1976. Clearly advances in medicine have been monumental over the last 25 years. However, to
alleviate the workload in the FDA, the Agency permits “piggybacking.”35 Thus many devices which are
not substantially equivalent to any pre-Amendment device (and therefore otherwise would have had to go
through the PMA process) can be approved for marketing using the substantially less onerous 510(k) route
if they are substantially equivalent to any legally marketed device. Thus, a device merely needs to show
substantial equivalence to a device that is substantially equivalent to a pre-Amendment device in order
to qualify for the PMN process. Piggybacking was meant to allow incremental changes to a device while
avoiding the PMA process.36 Medical device manufacturers commonly make incremental changes to their
devices, so lowering the regulatory barriers for improved devices was important in the medical device ﬁeld.
However, because manufacturers often cite a number of medical devices as predicates in order to claim that
aspects of the device under review are similar to aspects of older devices, the “equivalence” of the new device
and the pre-amendment device(s) can become diluted to the point that they are unrecognizable.37
Although review is substantially more abbreviated for 510(k)’s, the FDA occasionally demanded data showing
safety and eﬃcacy (as is required in a PMA).38 Manufacturers rallied against the FDA and got Congressional
support for a more limited scope of review. Thus, Congress limited the FDA to inquiring into the question
presented; thus for 510(k)’s the FDA is limited to inquiring whether the product is substantially equivalent
to the predicate device.39 Therefore the FDA is actually constrained from inquiring into the safety of a
device.
Congress has additionally limited the scope of FDA review in another way. In the 1997 Amendments,
Congress prohibited the FDA from considering uses other than the stated use when determining substantial
equivalence (or safety and eﬃcacy) of a device. Because doctors are permitted to use devices for oﬀ-label
35Munsey, supra note 30 at 169.
36Smith and Shyjan, supra note 24, at 436.
37Leﬂar, supra note 16, at 51.
38Id.
3921 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(D).
11uses, and because so much rides on the “intended use” of a medical device (i.e., if a post-Amendment device
does not have the same intended use as a pre-Amendment device, it is impossible for the devices to be
substantially equivalent), device manufacturers have been known to submit 510(k)’s listing a possible use of
their device as the intended use in order to have the device approved quickly for marketing. Once the device
is approved for marketing, the manufacturer can then subtly get information to the physicians about other
oﬀ-label uses (including potentially the “real” intended use). In this way, manufacturers are able to make an
end run around the regulations.40 Congressional disdain for this type of action was universal, and there was
considerable concern about how to regulate manufacturers who seek regulatory loopholes in order to market
their product. Congress thus found a compromise between the position of the FDA (who thought that it
should be able to review all foreseeable uses) and industry (who thought that the FDA should be limited
to reviewing the stated intended use) by limiting FDA investigation to the stated intended use but allowing
the FDA to impose labeling requirements regarding unapproved but foreseeable uses.
A Modest Proposal
Because the PMN process has morphed into a completely diﬀerent requirement than what was originally
envisioned, the alternative (PMA) route has almost become a punishment. One attorney stated, “If an
arguable basis exists for making a claim of substantial equivalence, a company would be remiss in not
trying the 510(k) route.”41 Because counsel advise their clients to try the 510(k) route in hopes of quick
and inexpensive approval, one must take a second look at the process and product to determine whether
they are desirable. In 1976, the goal in the minds of Congress and the FDA was to ensure public safety
40U.S. Surgical created a device intended to remove breast tumors. However, they marketed the device (thus the “intended
use” of the device) was for removing biopsy samples. The company created a video marketing the product for removal of breast
tumors and distributed it in Canada. The FDA found that because the device excised ten times the tissue of standard biopsy
devices, and because the same product was marketed abroad for diﬀerent indications, the company facetiously listed biopsy
as the intended use, when the real intended use was to remove tumors. as referred by Congress. See Regulating Innovation:
FDA’s Medical Device Approval Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight, 101st Cong. (1994).
41Kahan, 39 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 510 (1984), reprinted in 2 Harv J. L. Tech. 1, 47-48.
12and device eﬃcacy. The 510(k) was introduced as a patch to provide regulatory parity between competing
manufacturers. It seemed unfair that later entrants to the market would have had signiﬁcantly greater
regulatory burdens to bear. Because the 510(k) was intended to supplement, not supplant, the PMA’s,
Congress allowed the focus for 510(k) submissions to be on “substantial equivalence.” After all, in the
statutory scheme, the FDA was supposed to call for PMA’s for all Class III devices at some point in the near
future. Class II devices would likewise all have device-speciﬁc performance standards. Thus, safety would
be addressed for all devices eventually.
However, because most devices are currently “approved” for marketing via 510(k)’s, safety and eﬃcacy of
the devices is not relevant, except at the margin. Reviewers at the FDA simply determine whether the new
product is at least as safe and eﬀective as the predicate.42 If changes to the device adversely aﬀect safety
and eﬃcacy, the FDA scrutinizes the changes to determine whether the risk is worth any beneﬁt gained.
However, if the predicate device is ﬂawed in the same way that the new device is ﬂawed, the new device can
be marketed under the current regulations. Thus a ﬁnding of substantial equivalence is clearly not equivalent
to a ﬁnding of safety and/or eﬃcacy.43
The folly in this regulatory scheme can be seen by reviewing problems associated with silicone implants.
Silicone implants were on the market prior to 1976. Therefore, under the 1976 Amendments, they could
continue their marketing until the FDA called for a PMA from device manufacturers. Additionally, later
manufacturers of silicone implants could simply state that their implants were substantially equivalent to
those which were on the market prior to 1976, without ever questioning whether the pre-1976 devices were
themselves safe or eﬀective. Only after numerous signiﬁcant problems the FDA pulled silicone implants oﬀ
the market. The FDA was delayed largely because the manufacturer of the implants argued that secondary
issues, such as the grade of silicone, were the cause of many of the medical issues experienced. Additionally,
42Leﬂar, supra note 16, at 54.
43Id. at 28, and 21 C.F.R. 807.97.
13after the devices were shown to be dangerous at least in some tissues, the manufacturer refused to pull all
the implants oﬀ the market on the grounds that the remaining products were targeted for another use. If
silicone implant manufacturers had to show in any way that silicone implants were safe, potentially fewer
diﬃculties would have been suﬀered by the recipients of these implants.
Thus, Congress should reinstate the PMA as the single way in which Class III devices can enter the market.
FDA resources are limited, and critics undoubtedly would argue that all Class III devices could not possibly
be reviewed under PMA standards in a relatively short amount of time. Additionally, increased costs related
to PMA applications are a concern for the manufacturers, especially because the medical device ﬁeld, unlike
the drug ﬁeld, has many small manufacturers. However, a closer look at what the regulatory scheme would
be like if 510(k)’s were eliminated demonstrates that elimination of the 510(k)’s as premarket review for
Class III devices would not substantially harm manufacturers or the FDA, and would be of great beneﬁt to
the public.
Public Beneﬁt
The public would beneﬁt from creating a regulatory regime where all Class III medical devices are screened
for safety and eﬃcacy, and “substantial equivalence” to a pre-Amendment device is irrelevant. Currently,
important safety and testing data collected to support 510(k) submissions are unavailable to the public
due to the manufacturers’ desires to protect their proprietary information. However, because the FDA is
unable to denote a product “safe” or “eﬀective” simply by noting that the device is substantially equivalent
to a legally marketed device, users, physicians, hospitals, and insurance agencies are left to determine for
themselves which devices are truly safe. These parties do not have access to the relevant information under
the current scheme.
Furthermore, some medical devices are approved for marketing through the PMA process, and thus are
considered both safe and eﬀective by the FDA. The public has no easy way to determine how any given
14device came to market, and thus has no way of gauging how extensively the FDA has investigated the safety
and eﬃcacy of any particular device. Therefore, to eliminate the problem of information ﬂow and inability
to determine beforehand how any given device was approved for marketing, the FDA ought to simply ensure
that all devices on the market are safe and eﬀective. That is what the public relies on them for.
Before the 1997 Amendments were passed, industry complained that the FDA was looking into irrelevant
information, such as 1) the cost of the new device, 2) determining whether the new device was more eﬀective
than the devices currently available, and 3) whether the device had clinical utility.44 This brought a lot of
debate, and some argued that although the FDA was requiring extraneous information, “the Oﬃce of Device
Evaluation needs to focus its reviews on the issues that are important to ensure safety and eﬀectiveness.”45
Furthermore, device manufacturers noted with concern that the “FDA is emphasizing the science more rather
than the assumption that they have accepted in the past.”46 Manufacturers were correct in complaining
about FDA’s information requests regarding cost and relative eﬀectiveness of the new device. The FDA
should not be looking into the potential for commercial success of the medical device. After all, the market
should take care of any deﬁciencies in these areas, as long as information is available. On the other hand,
the FDA should be looking into clinical utility. The industry’s brashness in stating that the FDA should not
be looking into clinical utility should only be slightly more shocking than the fact that the FDA actually
should not have been looking into clinical utility of a 510(k) submission.
Furthermore, the public will be well served by requiring all Class III devices to go through the PMA process
because the 510(k) language is vague and has been interpreted broadly. For example, piggybacking results in
devices which look wholly dissimilar to anything on the market prior to 1976 having “substantially equivalent”
ﬁndings. The Oﬃce of Device Evaluation (ODE) releases a report every year which, among other things,
44Larry R. Pilot and Daniel R. Waldmann, Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997: Medical Device
Provisions, 53 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 267, 273 (1998).
45Regulating Innovation, supra note 40, at 33 (statement of Robert O’Halla, Chairman of Health Industries Manufacturers
Association, Product Approval Task Force and VP of Regulatory Aﬀairs at Johnson & Johnson), emphasis added.
46Id. at 45.
15lists “signiﬁcant medical device approvals.” These are devices which, in the view of the ODE, “represent
signiﬁcant medical breakthroughs because they are ﬁrst-of-a-kind, e.g., they use new technology or energy
source, or they provide a major diagnostic or therapeutic advancement....” Given that deﬁnition, one might
assume that these “breakthroughs” in medical devices that are “ﬁrst-of-a-kind” all went through the PMA
process. After all, the entire function of a PMA is to review an item that is novel. However, this is not the
case. For example, in 2002, nearly half of the devices on this list had gone through the 510(k) process.47
In 2000, more devices that made this list were cleared through the 510(k) process than the PMA process.48
Approximately 10 to 25 “substantially equivalent” devices made it to this list each year between 1999 and
2002.49
47Office of Device Evaluation, supra note 34. 13 of 32 were approved via the PMN process.
48Office of Device Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Report 8-11 (2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/annual/fy2000/ode/ode annual fy00.pdf. 25 of 40 devices went through the PMN process.
49Office of Device Evaluation, supra notes 47 and 48, and Office of Device Evaluation, Fiscal Year 2001 Annual
Report 10-15 (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/annual/fy2001/ode/annualreport2001.pdf.
16Time and Money
Critics of eliminating the 510(k) program charge that small businesses will be hurt by eliminating 510(k)’s.
After all, PMAs are signiﬁcantly more costly and time consuming than 510(k)’s. However, a number of small
companies currently ﬁle PMA’s.50 Thus, many small companies are already dealing with the expense and
more time-consuming nature of PMA’s. Additionally, because the FDA must scale review to the level of
danger posed by the device, manufacturers will not be unduly hampered by simply making a diﬀerent and
arguably a more relevant inquiry: that is, whether the device is safe and eﬀective as opposed to whether
it is substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device. For both 510(k)’s and PMA’s the FDA is charged with
requiring the “least burdensome means” available to answer the relevant question. Eliminating the 510(k)
for Class III devices will therefore simply focus the FDA’s attention to a question of more concern to the
public.
Discontinuing the PMA would also not be a substantial burden on the manufacturer because the diﬀerence
in complexity between 510(k)’s and PMAs is narrowing. As stated above, hybrid 510(k)’s have become
commonplace, and most manufacturers submit data to support the application without being asked.51 At
one time, the median 510(k) application was 10 pages and the average PMA application was 1000 pages.52
Additionally, one group found that a 510(k) with no clinical data costs between $50 and $2000 to submit,
whereas a PMA could cost as much as $830,000.53 However, many manufacturers have begun including
signiﬁcant amounts of clinical and pre-clinical data to support their 510(k) applications.54 Most also require
50Of the PMA approvals in 2000 and 2001, x% of them were ﬁled by companies which had a revenue of less than .
(This data considers not only the company itself, but any parent or other aﬃliated company to the company submitting the
application. Information here was obtained from the companies’ annual reports, SEC ﬁlings, and online data at the company
website. Some companies were privately held and therefore this information was unavailable.)
51Manufacturers sometimes put more information than they think is necessary in order to head oﬀ questions that may arise
and expedite the review. Regulating Innovation, supra note 40, at 81. See also Hutt and Merrill, supra note 6, at 755.
52Leﬂar, supra note 16, at 47.
53Id.
54Although the 510(k) and PMA applications are not public record, many of the summary sheets for the 510(k)’s and
PMA’s are. The summary sheets sometimes summarize in some detail the preclinical and clinical trials done in support of the
17some external regulatory legal counsel.55 Thus the $50-$2000 application is rare if existent today.
Moreover, when looking at the relative costs and time periods involved for market authorization via the
510(k) or PMA routes, one must consider that signiﬁcantly diﬀerent devices are being compared. A device
going through the PMA process is new and potentially harmful, and thus all types of questions about the
device must be answered. On the other hand, devices going through the 510(k) route may be substantially
more “established” and thus very little may be required for the FDA. Therefore the discrepancy in cost and
review time between PMA’s and 510(k)’s are not only a factor of the diﬀerent question being answered (i.e.,
whether the device is safe and eﬀective versus whether the device is substantially equivalent to a predicate
device), but also the technical complexity and novelty of the device itself. Therefore, merely comparing the
time and cost of PMA’s and 510(k)’s does not give a realistic picture of what the regulatory scheme would
be like if 510(k)’s were eliminated for Class III devices.
At ﬁrst glance, it would appear that eliminating the 510(k) for Class III devices would impose a signiﬁcant
burden on manufacturers in terms of time to market. One recurring complaint about the FDA is that
the review times are too long, even for 510(k) submissions. PMA submissions take a longer time on average
to review. Small manufacturers claim that the
delay in regulatory approval puts them particularly at a disadvantage, because they need the income
application. The 510(k) summary for the Hylashield CL contact lens lubricating eyedrop by Biomatrix lists 17 full preclinical
studies, 14 supportive studies, and clinical studies. In all, the device was tested in rats, owl monkeys, rabbits, guinea pigs, a
mouse cell line, mice, horses, and primate eyes.
55One medical device manufacturer testiﬁed that the cost of preparing the documentation (simply putting the document
together) exceeded $17,000. In other words, the $17,000 ﬁgure excluded the cost of testing. Regulating Innovation, supra note
40, at 56 and 81 (statement of Brad Kohl, President and CEO of Medical Safety Technologies).
18from the sales of their devices as soon as possible in order to remain solvent.56 The above graph57 depicts
the average review time, from initial ﬁling by the manufacturer to ﬁnal decision by the FDA. As noted in
the graph, the diﬀerence in review times between original PMA’s and original 510(k)’s is fairly substantial.
However, one must remember that the devices which are approved for marketing via the 510(k) route
are reviewed quickly largely because presumably a similar predicate device exists. Therefore, the original
510(k) applications are probably more appropriately compared to PMA supplements than original PMA
applications. As can be seen from the graph below, the PMA supplements generally have a review time
which is much more similar to that of the 510(k). Although the PMA supplements have a slightly longer
review time than 510(k)’s, the FDA reviews safety and eﬃcacy, which can be expected to take longer.
However, because the diﬀerence in review time is only marginal, and the end product is a determination
of safety and eﬃcacy (something the public cares about), this incremental delay in marketing should be
acceptable.
Furthermore, eliminating the 510(k) may actually speed up the reclassiﬁcation process in some circumstances.
§513(f)(2) of the 1997 amendments allow the FDA to reclassify a Class III device which has been found not
substantially equivalent (NSE). Thus, in order for a manufacturer to take advantage of this provision, the
manufacturer must have submitted a 510(k) with whatever supporting material it deemed appropriate, had
a ﬁnding of NSE by the FDA, and then initiated this process. The process itself would consider a novel
invention and the potential for harm it poses, and determine from that information whether the product
(deemed Class III because it was new) should be redesignated to Class I or Class II.58 In other words,
the process takes longer because it must go through a secondary supplemental process in order to approve
the device for marketing. A manufacturer cannot request reclassiﬁcation under this program until an NSE
ﬁnding has been made. If 510(k)’s were eliminated for all Class III devices, presumably a manufacturer
could request reclassiﬁcation before submitting a PMA. If the manufacturer ﬁrst had to submit a PMA,
the manufacturer would have no incentive to ﬁle for reclassiﬁcation as well. Thus, Class III devices which
should be reclassiﬁed may actually reach the market more quickly if 510(k)’s were eliminated for all Class
56Id. at 68 (statement of Mr. Joseph Mooibrock, President and CEO of American Medical Electronics, Inc.). Mr. Mooibrock
testiﬁed that not only are the delays costing the company signiﬁcant amounts of money, but required some employees to lose
their jobs.
57Office of Device Evaluation, supra note xxx?.
58Office of Device Evaulation, New Section 513(f)(2) – Evaluation of Automatic Class III Designation, Guidance
for Industry and CDRH Staff (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/modact/classiii.html.
19III devices.
User Fees
Additionally, collection of user fees ought to speed up the review process. The GAO reviewed the drug user
fee program (which has been in eﬀect since 1992) to determine whether the objectives of the program were
being obtained. The GAO found that drug user fees decreased all review times in drugs by allowing the FDA
to hire additional examiners and move resources within the FDA to work on drug approval.59 According to
the GAO, the average approval time went down from 27 months in 1993 to 14 months in 2001. The GAO
also found that there was a higher number of withdrawals for safety reasons, indicating that potentially the
quality of review has suﬀered. However, the FDA stated (and the GAO acknowledged) that the number of
drugs withdrawn for safety reasons was so small that a small change in the number of withdrawn drugs leads
to a large ﬂuctuation in percent of drugs withdrawn.60 Hopefully from the lessons learned with respect to
drug user fees, the medical device user fees will be able to avoid some of the diﬃculties experienced with
the drug user fees. At the very least, FDA hopefully will be able to decrease the attrition problem,61 which
leads both to longer review times and frustration among the manufacturers when the reviewer changes just
prior to market approval, and the new reviewer requires new tests.62
An additional beneﬁt to eliminating the 510(k)’s for all Class III devices is that a large amount of money
59United States General Accounting Office, Effect of User Fees on Drug Approval Times, Withdrawals, and
Other Agency Activities 8 (2002).
60Id. at 24.
61Id. at 18.
62Regulating Innovation, supra note 40 at 85 (statement of Mr. Mooibroek). For one of his company’s products, he had
four reviewers in three years. He testiﬁed that one frustration of his company was that they would reach the point where they
needed one more piece of data, and when the data came in, another reviewer would be in charge of the application and would
require a whole diﬀerent set of information.
20could be collected by the FDA in user fees. User fees are scaled on the amount of work the FDA assumed it
would require to review the application. Thus, for example, a PMA, panel track supplement63, and eﬃcacy
supplement64 all cost the same, probably because of the amount of data required in the submission. A
180-day supplement65 costs 21.5% of the PMA, a real time supplement66 costs 7.2% of a PMA, and a 510(k)
costs 1.75% of a PMA.67 The 510(k) and 180-day supplement percentages are subject to adjustment up if
the FDA ﬁnds that the revenue from device user fees is not as much as it expected.68 Under the current user
fee structure, a PMA costs $154,000, and a 510(k) costs $2187.69 Reduced fees for small manufacturers is
already built into the statute, where the ﬁrst PMA for a small manufacturer is free, and subsequent PMA’s
cost 10% of the fee charged to the larger companies.
Data Requirements
Critics should also recognize that like the spectrum of devices, the Agency has authority to regulate devices
commensurate with the amount of risk posed, i.e., require the “least burdensome means” to show safety and
eﬀectiveness for that type of device.70 Currently, even under 510(k) review, the manufacturer must guess
what is necessary to show that changes made to the device raise no new questions of safety and eﬃcacy.
Manufacturers routinely submit preclinical and clinical data to demonstrate the safety and eﬃcacy of the
device under review, and the FDA review is appropriately scaled to the amount of diﬀerence and potential
63Used when the new device requests a signiﬁcant change in design or performance of the device, or a new indication for use
of the device, and for which clinical data are generally necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and eﬀectiveness.
See infra, p. 26.
64An application that requires substantive clinical data.
65A supplement that is not panel-track, which requests a signiﬁcant change in components, materials, design, speciﬁcation,
software, color additives or labeling. See infra, p. 26.
66An application that requests minor changes to a device, such as minor changes to the design, software, manufacturing,
sterilization, or labeling, and for which application has required, and Agency has approved a meeting or similar forum to jointly
review and determine the status of the supplement. See infra, p. 26.
67H.R. Rept. No. 107-728, pt. 1 (2002), available at http://www.lexis.com.
68Id.
6921 U.S.C. §379j(c)(5).
7021 U.S.C. §360c(a)(3)(D)(ii), (i)(1)(D), Smith and Shyjan, supra note 24, at 435.
21danger posed by the device. The PMA process is likewise scaled to the level of novelty and perceived threat.71
Thus, the Agency should simply allow manufacturers to submit whatever data seems appropriate, and allow
the FDA to request additional data should the reviewer deem it necessary.72 While some might argue that
this will create a regime of overtesting, this is the current standard now.73
To prevent this from becoming an unwieldy burden on the FDA and ﬂedgling companies, the FDA should also
allow device manufacturers to provide data from similar devices in order to show safety and eﬃcacy. Critics
undoubtedly would charge that if data from similar devices is allowed, any statutory change eliminating
510(k)’s for Class III devices would exalt form over substance. However, this is not the case. First of all,
although manufacturers would be permitted to provide data from other devices to show safety and eﬃcacy,
the bottom line question is whether or not any given device is safe and eﬀective. In contrast, the underlying
question now for 510(k)’s is whether a device is substantially similar to a pre-1976 device, regardless of how
safe and eﬀective the pre-1976 device is. Secondly, there are no Class III devices which would be exempted
from this requirement. Therefore, even if for argument’s sake the manufacturers essentially submit a 510(k)
stating that they are similar to another device, the manufacturer must then also show that the predicate
device is also safe and eﬀective. Therefore, tragedies like the ones related to silicone implants will be largely
eliminated.
This is not entirely diﬀerent than the requirement now, so manufacturersshould not oppose the proposal too
strenuously. Currently, all 510(k) submitters must certify that a reasonable search of all information relating
to adverse safety and eﬀectiveness of a device has been made. Manufacturers are also required to provide a
summary of the discovered information, as well as the relevant citations in the 510(k).74 Although one large
71Leﬂar, supra note 16, at 61.
72FDA already has statutory authority to do this. With 510(k)’s, the data requested is generally less extensive and analyzed
less rigorously than that in a PMA. Leﬂar, supra note 16, at 55. Thus the current regulations turn 510(k)’s into “mini PMA’s”
or “hybrid 510(k)’s.” Id.
73Regulating Innovation, supra note 40, at 81 (statement of Mr. Kohl). Mr. Kohn testiﬁed that his company “provided
maybe more information on occasion in order to head oﬀ a question that we might have failed to address....”
7421 U.S.C. 360c(f).
22diﬀerence is that if the information does not exist, a manufacturer would have to test a device for safety and
eﬃcacy if the device were being reviewed under a PMA. Under the current statute, a manufacturer merely
has to search for relevant data that exists. Nonetheless, the fact that Congress added this requirement in
1997 indicates an acknowledgement that a showing of substantial equivalence really does not indicate safety
and eﬀectiveness.
Alternative Submissions
Supplemental PMA’s exist which may further ease the burden on the FDA and manufacturers. A guidance
document promulgated by the FDA stated how to know when to submit an original PMA versus a sup-
plement, and what type of supplement to submit.75 According to this document, an original PMA is only
required when “completely new pre-clinical and clinical data are needed for assuring safety and eﬀectiveness
of the modiﬁed device.”76 However, if the old-preclinical data is applicable to the new device but new clinical
data is required to show safety and eﬃcacy, a PMA supplement should be submitted.77 Likewise, if the old
clinical data supports use of the modiﬁed device but new pre-clinical data is required to show safety and
eﬃcacy, a PMA supplement is suﬃcient.78
As noted by the guidance document, a PMA supplement is generally required when there are: 1) new in-
dications for use for the device, 2) labeling changes, 3) the use of a diﬀerent facility or establishment to
manufacture, process, or package the device, 4) changes in the sterilization procedures, 5) changes in pack-
aging, 6) changes in the performance or design speciﬁcations, circuits, components, ingredients, principle
75Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice: Premarket Approval (PMA), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/mdufma/guidance/1201.pdf.
76Id. at 2, emphasis added.
77Id.
78Id.
23of operation, or physical layout of the device, or 7) extension of the expiration date of the device based
on data obtained under a new or revised stability or sterility testing protocol that has not been approved
by the FDA.79 This list of changes was divided up into categories which each correspond with a diﬀerent
submission. For example, the panel-track supplement is deﬁned as “a supplement to an approved premarket
application or premarket report under section 515 that requests a signiﬁcant change in design or performance
of the device, or a new indication for use of the device, and for which clinical data are generally necessary
to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and eﬀectiveness.”80 This deﬁnition is vague, and the related
regulation does not further clarify when this type of submission should be used.81 Thus, the FDA currently
requests panel-track supplements when there are new indications for use of the device, or signiﬁcant changes
in device design or performance that could signiﬁcantly aﬀect clinical outcome.82
Another type of PMA supplement, called the 180-day supplement, is statutorily deﬁned as “a supplement
to an approved premarket application or premarket report under section 515 that is not a panel-track sup-
plement and requests a signiﬁcant change in components, materials, design, speciﬁcation, software, color
additive, and labeling.”83 Thus, when there is a signiﬁcant change in the principle of operation, control
mechanism, device design performance, labeling (speciﬁcally labeling of contraindications), or new testing
requirements or acceptance criteria, the FDA suggests that a manufacturer submit a 180-day supplement.
Finally, the real time supplement is the third type of supplement. It is statutorily deﬁned as required when
the manufacturer “requests a minor change to the device, such as a minor change to the design of the device,
software, manufacturing, sterilization, or labeling, and ofr which the applicant has requested and the agency
has granted a meeting or similar forum to jointly review and determine the status of the supplement.”84
7921 C.F.R. 814.39(a) reprinted in Id. at 3.
80Section 747(4)(B) of MDUFMA, reprinted in Id.
81Id. at 4.
82Id.
83Id.
84Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act §737(4)(D) reprinted in Id.
24Thus, a manufacturer may submit a real-time supplement for minor changes to device design, labeling, or
sterilization and packaging.
The existence of these diﬀerent PMA supplements should further alleviate increased burdens due to the
elimination of 510(k)’s. By judicious use of these supplements, manufacturers will not be forced to “reinvent
the wheel” when the new device is truly substantially similar to a device legally on the market. The FDA
will additionally beneﬁt when manufacturers utilize these supplements because they will require less Agency
review time as well.
25Tort Liability
Tort law has recognized that a ﬁnding of substantial equivalence does not indicate that the device is safe.85
Manufacturers are shielded from tort liability when products go through the PMA process. However, there
is no liability shield when devices are introduced to the market through the PMA process. Some say that
the existence of a tort liability shield should encourage manufacturers ﬁle PMA’s, but that is unrealistic
because small manufacturers, such as those prevalent in the medical device ﬁeld, live hand to mouth. Thus,
they need to have their devices approved as quickly as possible. However, the needs of device manufacturers
may not be in line with the best interests of the American public. On one hand, injured people should be
able to recover from defective or injurious products, so a tort liability shield is a detriment. However, even
better than giving private people a cause of action in tort would be to prevent these objects from making
their way to the marketplace to begin with. Manufacturers can always ﬁle for bankruptcy if lawsuits become
too numerous or too expensive. However, if they are prevented from putting their products on the market
to begin with, that beneﬁts all Americans.
Conclusion
The ﬁrst of three principle purposes of the Medical Device Amendments that Thomas Scarlett (FDA Chief
Counsel) noted was “to assure that the control is commensurate with the hazard presented by a device.”86
Due to statutory changes over the past 25 years, the 510(k) largely circumvents this principle purpose by
disallowing the FDA to look at anything but the stated intended use and diﬀerences between the new device
85Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
86Food and Drug Law Institute’s 27th Annual Educ. Conference, Washington DC (12/13/83), reprinted in Hutt et al., supra
note 7, at 627.
26and predicate device(s). In order to protect the public from unsafe devices, the FDA must look into safety
and eﬃcacy, and not focus on substantial equivalence. Since the FDA can tailor the PMA process to the
level of hazard presented by utilizing supplemental PMA’s and requiring only the least burdensome means
to demonstrate safety and eﬃcacy, the 510(k) should be eliminated for all Class III devices. After all, under
the original statutory vision, the PMA was the way that most Class III devices were to be approved.
Current thinking in the FDA is moving in the opposite direction. In hopes of getting products to market
more quickly, the FDA may utilize post-market surveillance. Thus, under pressure from the industry, the
FDA essentially permits the manufacturers to conduct population-wide clinical trials so that devices can
get to market faster. Although post-market surveillance can be used beneﬁcially for many things, such as
continuing to insure the safety of the American public, it should not be used as a safety net because the
FDA is being pressured to approve devices too quickly. There is little evidence that the review times in fact
have decreased,87 but even if they had, it is hard to imagine why post-market surveillance is preferable to
premarket review. If premarket review were truly less useful than post-market surveillance, the FDA ought
to return to the pre-1976 regime where it was neither authorized nor expected to protect the American
consumer from medical products before harm occured.
However, because the 1976 Amendments were passed, clearly Congress had a regime in mind where a gov-
ernmental body ensured the safety and eﬀectiveness of medical products before they could cause substantial
harm. In line with this vision, all Class III devices should be regulated using the same standard: a showing
that the device is both safe and eﬀective. After all, the perception of the American public, as well as the
original statutory vision, is that the FDA’s role is to weed out devices that are unsafe or ineﬀective, not
devices that are not substantially equivalent to pre-1976 devices. Prior to the 1997 Amendments, one man-
ufacturer stated, “in addition to making sure that it is safe and eﬀective, it also gives a perceived value to
87Merrill, supra note 1 at 1829.
27the health care consumer that this product in fact does oﬀer a safe and eﬀective means for whatever purpose
it was designed.”88
Thus, it seems that the premarket notiﬁcation process has moved far beyond what it was intended to do.
Moreover, the problem that it was meant to address has long since ameliorated.
Congress gave its attention to the problem of barriers to market entry by decreasing the
burden of proof of device eﬀectiveness as compared with the drug law, by establishing the
product development protocol as a shortcut to a marketing license, and by providing for
reclassiﬁcation to a regulatory status not requiring premarket approval. The Agency’s ven-
turing beyond the congressional mandate, by adopting a long-term substantial-equivalence-
based premarket review policy in order to further lower barriers to entry, can no longer be
justiﬁed on the ground of encouraging competition. The congressional purpose of establish-
ing regulatory standards providing reasonable assurance of safety and eﬀectiveness for all
medical devices eventually must be given primacy.89
While we may be concerned about new entrants into the device ﬁeld, recent statutory changes have signif-
icantly changed the landscape for new devices. Device user fees and the interpretation of vague statutory
language indicate that requiring PMA’s for all Class III devices may be warranted.
Not only does the elimination of the 510(k) for Class III devices have the beneﬁt of focusing regulatory
attention on something that matters, but it also eliminates several incidental problems as well. For example,
there will be no ﬁctitious line between devices created for one purpose and those created with a diﬀerent
intended use. Manufacturers would be less inclined to facetiously declare that their device’s intended use
is something diﬀerent because intended use is no longer as critical a question. Each indication would likely
88Regulating Innovation, supra note 40, at 56 (1994) (statement of Brad A. Kohl, President of Medical Safety Technologies,
Inc.).
28take the same amount of time to get through FDA review, and thus manufacturers would be encouraged to
be honest about the intended use in order to only go through the premarket approval process once. Addi-
tionally, manufacturers will be able to retain their proprietary information from their competitors without
resulting in harm to the public. Since all Class III devices will be safe and eﬀective, testing data garnered
for FDA submissions will be irrelevant to the public.
Although PMA’s may take marginally longer to review on average and may be more expensive for manu-
facturers, this private cost may be passed to the public once the device is on the market. Cost diﬀerentials
may not be that great anyway, given that most manufacturers submit hybrid 510(k)’s with varying amounts
of preclinical and clinical data. At any rate, the beneﬁt to the public of a single regulatory scheme which
focuses on the important question of whether the device is safe and eﬀective far outweighs the incremental
cost and inconvenience to manufacturers.
Thus the FDA ought to return to its statutory role, that is, to require manufacturers to show safety and
eﬃcacy. An inquiry, no matter how thorough, into substantial equivalence is an ineﬃcient allocation of
resources. Substantial equivalence has no relevance outside the FDA.90
90Goldberger, supra note 10, at 330.
29